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PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES ARE LUMINOUS PROPERTIES
GEOFFREY HALL
Abstract. What is the connection between having a phenomenal property and knowing
that one has that property? A traditional view on the matter takes the connection to
be quite intimate. Whenever one has a phenomenal property, one knows that one does.
Recently most authors have denied this traditional view. The goal of this paper is to defend
the traditional view. In fact, I will defend something much stronger: I will argue that what
it is for a property to be phenomenal is for it to be a (consistent) property one must know
oneself to have when on has it. As we will see, this theory has a number of surprising and
welcome upshots, suggesting that the traditional view has been unjustly maligned.
1. Introduction
Theories of phenomenal consciousness divide into first order and higher order varieties.1
More often than not, however, proponents of both varieties unite in rejecting a luminous
conception of phenomenal features according to which, roughly, they comprise all and only
those features that one couldn’t have without being aware that one has (or at least without
being in a position to be aware that one has).2 Proponents of first order varieties reject such
a conception because they reject any constitutive link between consciousness and epistemic
properties.3 Thus, according to Dretske,
Failure to understand how [an experience can be conscious without anyone
being conscious of having it] constitutes a failure to understand what makes
something conscious and, hence, what consciousness is. (1993, p. 263)
1Here is a partial list of works defending first-order theories: Seigel 2010, Speaks 2015, Byrne 2001, Pautz
2010, Dretske 2000; 2003, Tye 1995, and Chalmers 2004. And here is a partial list of texts defending
higher order theories: Rosenthal 2004; 2005, Carruthers 2005; 2016, Lycan 1996, and Armstrong 1968.
2See Williamson 2000, Weatherson 2004, Berker 2008, and Srinivasan 2015 for discussion. Also Lewis
1996, p. 553.
3See in particular Dretske 1993; 2006.
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Proponents of common varieties of higher order theses about consciousness reject the
luminous conception because it does not respect the primary motivation for their view,
namely, that one and the same feature is sometimes conscious and sometimes not. Thus
according to Carruthers,
The main motivation behind higher-order theories of consciousness . . . derives
from the belief that all (or at least most) mental-state types admit of both
conscious and unconscious varieties. (2016)
This paper is a defense of the luminous conception of phenomenal features. Properly
formulated this conception provides a simple, elegant and (arguably) reductive theory of the
phenomenal that has quite a bit more going for it than has often been supposed. I formulate
the theory in §2 and situate it within the literature. In §3, I provide several novel arguments
for the view and engage in some light theory building to illustrate potential applications.
There have been many objections to this view in the literature. Some of them seem to me to
have rather straightforward responses; some less so. In §4, I formulate and respond to what
I take to be the most pressing objections to the theory.
2. Phenomenal Properties as Luminous Properties
Let’s start with some initial definitions to fix ideas. A phenomenal property is a property
that there is something it is like for one to have. Being in pain, for instance, is a phenomenal
property since there is something that it is like to be in pain. Having brown hair, on the
other hand, is not a phenomenal property, since one can have this property without being
conscious at all. Say that a property is luminous just in case having that property entails
knowing that you have it.4 Finally, say that a property is consistent if it does not entail
4The term ‘luminous’ was introduced by Williamson (2000). Williamson talks of luminous conditions (triples
of worlds, times and subjects), I talk of luminous properties. This is because the subject of the paper is
phenomenal properties. One could approach phenomenal properties via luminous conditions in a roundabout
way (somewhat similarly to the way in which Williamson approaches narrow and broad states in terms of
narrow and broad conditions). But I see no reason in particular to do this. The focus on properties instead
of conditions also helps avoid potential counterexamples to the thesis I will defend.
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every property.5 According to the luminous conception of phenomenal properties, a property
is phenomenal if and only if it is consistent and luminous.
But the thesis is not just that phenomenal properties happen to coincide with the consis-
tent luminous properties. The thesis I intend to defend is more radical: being consistent and
luminous is just what it is to be phenomenal. In particular, I aim to defend the following
metaphysical analysis:
LC For any property F , for F to be phenomenal is for F to be a consistent
luminous property.6
If mutually entailing properties are identical, then since knowing that one is F entails
being F , the thesis admits of an equivalent and illuminating definition.
For any F , for F to be phenomenal is for F to be consistent and such that to
be F is to know the you are F .7
5This paper takes property entailment as primitive. I will suppose that if F entails G then necessarily
everything is necessarily G if F but remain, for the most part, agnostic on the converse. In various places
in what follows I will make assumptions about what entailment is like. I will flag these assumptions when
made. I will also remain agnostic on what properties are. My preferred framework is to treat property
talk as shorthand for sentences that involve quantification into predicate position. So regimented ‘being
phenomenal’ is properly treated as a higher-order predicate: a ‘predicate’ that combines with a predicate to
give a sentence. But these issues are mostly orthogonal to the subject of this paper.
6When I say that F entails knowing that one is F , I do not mean that necessarily any person who is F
knows that they are F . Rather I mean that necessarily anything whatsoever that is F knows that it is F .
This avoids possible counterexamples like existing or being self identical. Perhaps all persons automatically
count as knowing that they are identical to themselves. But self identity does not entail knowledge of such
identity: ordinary objects like rocks and trees are self identical but do not know anything. I should also
note that the thesis LC could be true without being knowable a priori.Thus LC does not automatically face
the ‘distinct existence argument’ which turns on the claim that one can conceive of having a phenomenal
property without the corresponding knowledge (see Stoljar 2016.) All that this argument establishes is
that LC is not a priori true. Without substantial assumptions connecting conceivability and metaphysical
possibility, it does not refute LC.
7Let pC(F )q abbreviate pF is consistentq and pK(x, p)q abbreviate px knows that pq. Define K∗ to be the
relation that obtains between oneself and a property if one knows oneself to have that property:
K∗ := λFxK(x, (Fx))
Then idea is that the phenomenal properties are precisely the consistent fixed points of K∗:
Phenomenal = λF (C(F ) ∧K∗(F ) = F )
(Note that on a coarse grained conception of properties the property of sitting and not sitting may well be
identical to the property of knowing that one is sitting and not sitting since both are impossible to have.
Thus the requirement that the properties in question be consistent is crucial to avoid such counterexamples.)
3
On this conception of phenomenal properties, they are completely pinned down by their
distinctive epistemic role. Sometimes in what follows I will suppose that properties are coarse
grained in this way, though in general not much will depend on this. If we do suppose that
properties are coarse grained in this way, it simplifies some aspects of the discussion, but it
is by no means required by the luminous conception of phenomenal features.
The thesis LC provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a property to be phenom-
enal in terms that do not presuppose or employ phenomenal notions. Indeed if correct it
tells us what it is for a property to be phenomenal in terms that do not presuppose or em-
ploy phenomenal notions. The relevant notion of entailment is meant to be a worldly or
metaphysical notion of entailment. Whether one property entails another is not a matter
of the phenomenal properties of any actual or possible agent. Being F entails being G only
if it is necessary that something is G if it is F , where the sense of ‘necessity’ at issue is a
broad objective necessity rather than an epistemic one.8 More controversially, whether some
proposition is known is not in general a matter of the phenomenal properties of any actual
or possible agent. It is consistent to suppose a world has knowers at a given time even if no
one at that world has any phenomenal properties at that time (perhaps all knowers fall into
a dreamless sleep, for instance). If knowledge iterates and so knowing p entails knowing that
you know p, then according to LC knowing p is phenomenal for any p. This would strain
the sense of ‘phenomenal’ at issue since for many propositions there is intuitively nothing
that it is like to know them. The motivations that I take to favor LC are consistent with
knowledge failing to iterate. In what follows I’ll suppose that knowledge does fail to iterate.9
Supposing that there are phenomenal properties, it is of course a consequence of LC
that we sometimes do know that we have them. Since pain is a paradigmatic phenomenal
property, LC implies that we sometimes know that we are in pain. Wittgenstein famously
declared the assertion ‘I know I am in pain’ to either be nonsense or else simply an elliptical
8Williamson 2016.
9More generally, this thesis has implausible consequences when combined with any view according to which,
for some dispositional mental state F , being F requires knowing that one is F . My own view is that no such
thesis is plausible enough on its own to rule out LC, and for the purposes of this paper I will suppose that
one can always fail to know that one is in some dispositional mental state.
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way of asserting ‘I am in pain’.10 Note that if being in pain just is knowing that one is in
pain, then anyone who asserts that they know they are in pain asserts that they are in pain.
So in some sense LC, when combined with a coarse grained account of properties, vindicates
the letter of Wittgenstein’s view. But the thesis, as I intend it, is incompatible with the
spirit of Wittgenstein’s view. On my view, knowledge is a relation between individuals and
propositions. To bear the knowledge relation to the proposition that grass is green is to
know that grass is green and to bear it to the proposition that one is in pain is to know
that one is in pain. LC is a thesis about that relation. It states that having a phenomenal
property F entails bearing the knowledge relation to the proposition that one is F . Thus on
my view, we often, indeed always, know that we have phenomenal properties in the ordinary
sense of ‘knows’ in which it is also true that we often know facts about the weather.11
Many philosophers are familiar with both the notion of a luminous property (or related
notions) and the notion of a phenomenal property. Moreover, assertions that phenomenal
properties happen to be luminous or are luminous because they are phenomenal are familiar
albeit controversial. But the claim that being phenomenal consists in being luminous might
seem a bit jarring. So before I get to what I take to be the strongest arguments in favor
of the analysis, I want to highlight several traditions of thinking on the phenomenal with
which LC is congruous.
Consider first an overly simplistic higher order thought (HOT) theory of phenomenal
properties according to which for a property F to be phenomenal is for one to be aware that
one is F . Mundane counterexamples to this thesis come from properties like being a human
being, having black hair and other obviously non-phenomenal properties one is aware that
one has. A standard fix is to put some extra conditions on the property F . For instance, we
might say that a property F is phenomenal if being F is a mental state and, moreover, one
is aware that one is F . One’s phenomenal properties are all and only the mental states that
10See Wittgenstein 1953, section 246.
11The thesis LC may of course be incompatible with some specific analyses of knowledge, for example it may
be incompatible with certain tracking accounts of knowledge. On my view, knowledge is a factive mental
state of some kind that is familiar enough to reason about absent any specific analysis. See Williamson
2000 for this conception of knowledge.
5
one is aware that one has. Perhaps further conditions can be put on how that awareness is
generated and what kind of mental state being F is supposed to be.
One immediate problem with this line of thought is that the analysis of the phenomenal
now makes reference to the somewhat unclear notion of a mental state. Thus in order for
HOT to offer any kind of illuminating account of the phenomenal it has to be supplemented
with an account of what it is for a property to be a mental state. LC can be seen as a
way of getting around the mundane counterexamples to HOT without appealing to some
unexplained notion of a mental state. The phenomenal properties are not merely the ones
that one is aware of, but the ones that one cannot help but be be aware of.12There being
something that it is like to be F , according to LC, consists in the fact that being F and
being aware that you are F are one and the same.13
LC offers a plausible explanation to those who think that phenomenal properties and
beliefs are sufficiently tightly connected so that having the phenomenal property entails
believing that one has the phenomenal property.14 If having the phenomenal property simply
is knowing that one has the phenomenal property, then provided that knowledge entails
belief, we have a plausible explanation of the connection. LC will also be an improvement
on those views that take phenomenal properties to be those such that to have them is just to
believe that you have them. For instance, David Lewis expresses sympathy for this thought
when discussing experiential properties:
12Sometimes I’ll use talk of awareness in place of talk of knowledge when it seems natural to do so. The
official formulation though is in terms of knowledge. LC can be brought closer to traditional HOT theories if
we combine it with the thesis that knowing p is a mental state for any p. My own view is that the application
of any stative propositional attitude to a proposition (in its “second” argument place) should result in a
mental state, but this is not required to accept LC. See Williamson 1995; Williamson 2000, ch. 1, and
Nagel 2013. Since the notion of awareness at issue in this paper is always relational, this also distinguishes
the view defended here from a somewhat similar thesis defended by Montague (2016) according to which
awareness entails awareness of awareness.
13As mentioned above one reason not to take this route is that that it does not respect the standard HOT
claim that some properties can have the property of being phenomenal contingently, at least not given
some standard and plausible assumptions. Suppose that F is phenomenal and so consistent and such that
F = K∗(F ). Since, plausibly, F is necessarily consistent if consistent and necessarily identical to K∗(F ) if
identical to K∗(F ) it follows that necessarily F is consistent and such that F = K∗(F ). Given the further
claim that metaphysical analyses are metaphysically necessary it follows that necessarily F is phenomenal.
14For relevant discussion see Weatherson 2004 and Berker 2008.
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I rather think that an experience of a certain (suitable) kind and a belief that
one is having an experience of that kind are one and the same thing. (1999,
p. 6)
But there is always a potential worry with these views that one could mistakenly take
oneself to have a phenomenal property that one does not have. Indeed one of the main
problems for higher order thought theorists is the contention that it makes higher order
misrepresentation impossible.15 LC avoids these problems by formulating the thesis in terms
of knowledge instead of the non-factive attitudes of thought and belief.16
Let me be clear that these are not the reasons why I think one should accept LC. Both
HOT and doxastic phenomenal connections are just too controversial to motivate its accep-
tance. The purpose of mentioning them here is just to show that LC is a natural principle
to accept if one has sympathies with these research programs since in the one case it cap-
tures the intuition that being phenomenal has something to do with higher order awareness
without recourse to new primitives and in the other offers explanations of propositions that
some have been disposed to accept.
3. Motivations
So why should we accept the luminous conception of phenomenal properties? On my view,
the strongest motivation for LC is that it is a simple, strong and perspicuous theory. Below
I will outline three specific manifestations of this. In overview: LC unifies and explains
attractive theses in epistemology by giving phenomenal properties a distinctive evidential
role; LC is what we might expect to hold given a functionalist theory of mind according to
which mental states are identified by their functional roles; and finally, and perhaps most
importantly, LC offers a route to something like a reductive analysis of consciousness in
non-phenomenal terms. This seems to me a welcome and surprising prediction that should
be of interest to philosophers who are ultimately unconvinced.
15See Byrne 1997 and Neander 1998.
16It is consistent to hold that a believes that a is F when a is not F even if being F is luminous.
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3.1. Epistemology and Phenomenal Properties. The following three principles have
received quite a bit of defense within the literature on epistemology:17
Phenomenal Conservatism: For any P , if it seems to one that P , then one is justified
in believing that P .
Evidentialism: For any P , if one is justified in believing that P , then the proposition that
P is supported by one’s evidence.
E = K: For any P , one knows that P if and only if the proposition that P is part of one’s
evidence.
Generally those who accept Phenomenal Conservatism reject Evidentialism and E
= K. However, LC provides a way in which the theses can all come out true. For suppose
that it’s seeming to one that P is phenomenal. Hence, whenever it seems to one that P ,
one knows that it seems to one that P . So by E = K, it’s seeming to one that P is part
of one’s evidence. Since, plausibly, the proposition that it seems to one that P raises the
probability that P , this allows us to hold Phenomenal Conservtism without giving up
Evidentialism.18
Here is another way to put the argument. If Phenomenal Conservatism, Eviden-
tialism and E=K are true, then whenever it seems to one that P , that P is supported by
what one knows. But if this holds for any case, the only relevant proposition to know that
can support P will be the proposition that it seems to one that P . Thus the conjunction
of these three principles naturally leads to the claim that seemings are luminous. Since
seemings are paradigms of phenomenal states, this accords with the requirements of LC.
Of course many will be inclined to reject one of the above principles precisely because
they do not think seemings luminous. But each of the above principles has quite a bit
17For discussion of Phenomenal Conservatism see Pryor 2000 and Huemer 2001; 2007. For a defense
of Evidentialism see Feldman and Conee 1985 and Williamson 2000, ch. 9. Williamson (2000, ch. 9)
also defends E = K.
18Of course one might give up one of these principles for different reasons. Bacon (2014), for instance, shows
that there is a tension between Evidentialism and E = K given an anti-skeptical epistemology together
with a probabilistic analysis of support. These worries do not effect my overall case since the hard cases are
those concerning knowledge of the future, not knowledge of one’s own present phenomenal state.
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going for it. The theory consisting of LC and the above three principles gives phenomenal
properties a distinguished evidential role. For any phenomenal property F , that one is F
is part of one’s evidence if and only if one is F . Consequently when evaluating whether a
subject is justified in believing a proposition, we can always take into account how things
stand phenomenally with that subject. The result is a knowledge first view that validates
phenomenal conservatism and recognizes a special distinguished role for phenomenal evidence
in the justification of belief.19
3.2. Phenomenal Properties and Functionalism. Another motivation for LC stems
from the plausibility of functionalism. While sameness of functional role might not suffice
in every case for sameness of property, it is certainly evidence of this. And it seems quite
plausible that for any phenomenal property F , being F and knowing that you are F will
play the same functional role. Consider the state of being in pain. A sort of standard gloss
of its functional role is that it is a
a state that tends to be caused by bodily injury, to produce the belief that
something is wrong with the body and the desire to be out of that state, to
produce anxiety, and, in the absence of any stronger, conflicting desires, to
cause wincing and moaning. (Levin , 2018)
But this functional role is also plausibly played by the state of knowing that one is in pain.
If one were to guess which state was being functionally characterized in the above quotation,
it is unclear what grounds there would be for saying it was pain as opposed to knowledge of
pain.
Perhaps one could object by saying that knowledge of pain might lead one to, for instance,
take pain killers but mere pain without knowledge of pain would not. But we should be
careful to distinguish knowing that one is in pain under the guise of the sentence ‘I am in
pain’ and knowing that one is in pain under some guise or other. If I am in pain, I know
19The view thus vindicates Schellenberg’s (2013; 2016) contention that subjects in indiscriminable cases can
share phenomenal evidence while still differing in factive evidence, although it does so in a way that is not
congenial to her overall project.
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that I feel like this. I know this even if I am unsure whether to describe how I am feeling
using the word ‘pain’. But since I am indeed in pain, what I know when I know that I feel
like this is that I am F , where F is the property of being in pain.
Others might object that it is impossible for being in pain and knowing that one is in pain
to have the same functional role since sometimes being in pain causes one to know that one
is in pain, but knowing that one is in pain can never cause itself. I of course deny the view
that in general the link between knowing that one is in pain and being in pain is causal. But
there isn’t any general case for that view. It is commonplace for one to know that p despite
its being false that one believes that p because p, especially where the sense of ‘because’ is
causal. For instance, we commonly have knowledge of mathematical facts, moral facts, and
facts about the future. But presumably such facts cannot be part of the cause in our beliefs
concerning them.
Now of course, some will object to this argument on the grounds that some creatures have
pain while lacking knowledge altogether and so trivially pain and knowledge of pain differ
in functional role in at least some creatures. I will address the case of nonhuman animals in
the next section. Here I am only claiming that at least in human adults, our description of
the functional role of pain largely overlaps our description of the functional role of knowing
that one is in pain, which goes some way towards confirming LC.
3.3. LC as an account of what it is to be conscious. I take the above considerations
to provide some initial motivation for endorsing LC. They are by no means knock down
arguments. My overall argumentative strategy, however, is abductive. The theory comprised
of LC with plausible auxiliary assumptions recommends itself on the basis of simplicity and
perspicuity. A case in point is that LC together with plausible and shared assumptions
affords us something like an account of what it is to be conscious that does not use or
presuppose any phenomenal notions.
Suppose that the property of being conscious is the most general phenomenal property,
that phenomenal property one has if one has any phenomenal properties at all. Then the
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thesis LC can be used to uniquely pin down consciousness in non-phenomenal terms: the
property of being conscious is the unique consistent luminous property that is entailed by
every consistent luminous property. I think this is a very interesting and striking accomplish-
ment. With very minimal resources, LC delivers an account of what it is to be conscious.
One might object that being conscious is not the most general phenomenal property on the
grounds that it is not phenomenal. Some authors exclude consciousness from the category
of the phenomenal even though they include more specific determinates. Speaks (2015),
for instance, stipulates that ‘phenomenal property’ means ‘determinate of the property of
being conscious’. Since nothing is a determinate of itself, being conscious is not phenomenal
on Speaks’ account. I am working with a broader conception of phenomenal properties as
simply “properties for which there is something that it is like to have.” Being conscious is
not obviously excluded from that category. The determinates of such determinables may still
form a natural class and thus there is not much theoretical cost if some generalizations about
the phenomenal need to be restricted to determinate phenomenal properties. Additionally,
even without the assumption that being conscious is phenomenal, we may still be able to
extract an account of what it is to be conscious. For instance, if properties are relatively
coarse grained, we can pick out consciousness as the least upper bound of the phenomenal
properties under entailment. Consciousness will be the unique property entailed by every
phenomenal property that moreover entails every property entailed by any phenomenal prop-
erty.20 If we call the least upper bound under entailment of some properties the disjunction
of those properties, then the thesis can be equivalently formulated as: to be conscious is to
have the disjunction of the consistent luminous properties.21
20Suppose that properties form a complete lattice with respect to the ordering of entailment. This would be
guaranteed by the theory that properties are functions from worlds to extensions, though is also compatible
with more fine grained accounts of properties. Where P is the set of all phenomenal properties, the proposal is
then that the property of being conscious is the join
∨
P . Given LC, the set P has an “intrinsic” description
in non-phenomenal terms. The notion of a join is also defined non-phenomenally. Thus given LC, being
conscious can be singled out by an intrinsic, non-phenomenal description.
21Note that if being F and being G are consistent and luminous it does not automatically follow that being
F or being G is consistent and luminous. If one is F then one knows one is F and is F or G. But in order
to know one is F or G requires another inference. Thus this proposal is compatible with those who want to
exclude the property of being conscious from the phenomenal.
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3.4. Knowledge and phenomenal intentionality. One objection someone might have to
this line of thought is that since the proposed definition of consciousness makes reference to
knowledge, it cannot be claimed to be a reductive definition at all since ultimately knowledge
should be defined in terms of the notion of a phenomenal property. My own view is that the
notion of knowledge is quite a bit clearer than than the notion of a phenomenal property and
thus we should welcome an analysis of the latter in terms of the former. Some philosophers
disagree. According to the phenomenal intentionality theory the phenomenal is a “main
ingredient” in the analysis of intentional states more broadly There is a potential for conflict:
according to LC, the phenomenal is partly constituted by knowledge. According to the
phenomenal intentionality theory, knowledge is partly constituted by the phenomenal (since
all intentional states are). But if A is partly constituted by B then B is not partly constituted
by A. Thus LC is not compatible with the phenomenal intentionality theory.
On closer inspection the conflict is seen to be illusory. For instance, Bourget and Mende-
lovici (2018) offer three different formulations of the theory, the strongest of which they call
“Strong PIT”:
Strong PIT: All intentional states are phenomenal intentional states.
Since knowing that one is F is certainly an intentional state, Strong PIT entails that
the explanation of the phenomenal offered by the luminous conception makes reference to a
particular phenomenal state. But there is nothing in general troubling about an analysis of
being F that mentions some particular F . There may even be reductive analyses of various
properties that mention instances of those properties. For example, consider the analysis of
the property of being an even integer:
for an integer n to be even is for there to be some integer k such that the
product of the integer 2 with k is identical to n.
This analysis entails that 2 is itself an even integer, and thus that the analysis of being
an even integer makes reference to a particular even integer. Nevertheless, the analysis
is illuminating and in some sense reductive. Learning this analysis can put someone in a
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position to understand ‘even integer’ who did not grasp that notion prior to learning the
definition.
The luminous conception of phenomenal properties thus has some distinctive benefits: it
allows for a synthesis in epistemology of views usually thought to be in opposition, it is
confirmed by our failure to isolate different functional roles for phenomenal properties and
our knowledge of phenomenal properties, and it provides a simple and perspicuous account
of the phenomenal. I now want to turn to what I take to be the more salient objections to
the view that have been offered in the literature.22
4. Objections and Replies
4.1. Accessibility. The following story seems possible. Late for work I search my room
desperately for my one missing shoe. After completing what I take to be a thorough search
and turning up empty, I ask my roommate for help. Upon entering, they notice the shoe,
lying on top of my bed. In this situation, surely I saw the shoe. It was there in plain sight,
so to speak. When I was searching, as my eyes scanned the room, there was a point when
I looked right at it. Eyes wide open, one could have drawn two straight lines, roughly five
feet in length, from each of my eyes to the shoe. It seems perfectly natural to say in such a
situation that while I had a visual experience of the shoe, I didn’t know that I did. If I had
known at the time that I had this experience, why did I not act on this knowledge? Why
did I continue to search the room? Why did I utter the sentence ‘I cannot find my shoe! I
looked everywhere in my room and did not see it!?
If we attempt to turn these rhetorical questions into explicit arguments, we find that they
rely on premises that, while somewhat plausible, are open to question. For instance, one
22One further motivation I’ll briefly mention concerns the relation between experience and vagueness. Many
authors have expressed sympathy for the thesis that it can never be borderline whether something is conscious
(see e.g., Antony (2006, 2008) and Simon (2017)). The principle of LC, together with standard principles
governing the relationship between borderliness and knowledge, explain why this would be so. For suppose
that knowledge precludes borderlineness: if one knows that p then it is not borderline whether p. Then if
being conscious is a phenomenal property, LC entails that whenever one is conscious, it is not borderline
whether one is conscious. Say that it is determinate that p if and only if p and it is not borderline whether
p. Then we can put this conclusion as follows: if one is conscious, it is determinate that one is conscious.
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might attempt to argue that (I) I had an experience of the shoe, and (II) if I had known that
I had an experience of the shoe, I wouldn’t have continued to search the room, but (III) I
did continue to search the room, so (IV) I did not know that I had an experience of the shoe
and thus (C) I had an experience of the shoe and I did not know that I had an experience
of the shoe. If having an experience of the shoe is a phenomenal property, we can then turn
this into an argument against LC.
For the purposes of this section I’ll grant that having an experience of the shoe is phe-
nomenal. We can question premise (II). There are plenty of cases in which it is plausible to
say that one knows something despite the fact that they failed to act on what they knew.
Not all of one’s knowledge is actionable in every case. More generally, it is not true that if
one knows that p, then the proposition that p is accessible in the sense of being available for
use in theoretical and practical reasoning in every single case.
Take the following example. I know, and have known for many years, what my social
security number is, despite the fact that there have been instances where I was unable to
recall the number. Thus plausibly there are cases in which I know that my social security
number is x without being able to recall that it is x. If there are cases in which one knows
that p despite being unable to recall that p, then we should expect cases in which one does
not act as if p even though they know that p. If one knows that p, then perhaps they have a
disposition to act as if p. But this does not mean the disposition will manifest itself in every
case. This just goes to show that the premise ‘If I had known that I had an experience of
the shoe then I wouldn’t have continued to search the room’ is open to question. We can
further solidify this judgment by extending the original case given above.
Imagine that I decide to give up on the search and leave the house wearing another pair
of shoes. Upon leaving, however, I suddenly recall that I did in fact see the shoe on the bed.
This strikes me as a commonplace experience. I cannot recall what I did not already know.
Thus I did know that I saw the shoe, I just did not realize that I knew this - the knowledge
I had was implicit. I say that this is possible. And if it is possible, another alternative
explanation of the above case presents itself: I saw the shoe, I knew that I saw the shoe,
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but I did not attend to the fact that I saw the shoe (i.e., the knowledge I had was implicit
in some sense).
Put somewhat more abstractly the response is that while the phenomena identified in the
example is real, they do not provide counterexamples to LC. According to those who think
it provides a counterexample to LC, they should be described as cases in which one has
some phenonomenal property but fails to know; according to me they are cases in which one
has some phenomenal property but fails to attend or explicitly know.23 We should favor the
latter description over the former because for any such case there is a case that is similar in
all the relevant respects but in which the subject later recalls that they had the phenomenal
property thus showing that they did in fact know they had the phenomenal property after
all. The claim that one fails to explicitly know or attend is not some ad hoc posit but is
rather needed to explain the phenomena.
4.2. Nonhuman Animals. Some philosophers have objected to the luminous conception
on the grounds that it over intellectualizes the phenomenal. If knowing that . . . F . . . requires
having the concept of F , then knowing that one is in pain requires having the concept of
pain. But, these philosophers maintain, many creatures can be in pain that lack the concept
of pain—perhaps some creatures can be in pain that lack concepts altogether. Even if there
are no actual creatures like this, surely it is possible that something be in pain but lack the
concept of pain. If that’s right then LC must be false.
What is it to have the concept pain? On a deflationary reading, to have the concept pain
is just to be able to have beliefs about pain. So interpreted the argument might be put this
way:
(1) Possibly something is in pain but is not able to believe that it is in pain.
(2) Necessarily, whatever one knows one is able to believe.
(3) Thus it is not necessary that if one is in pain one knows that one is in pain. (1,2)
23And hence LC should be construed as the thesis that F is phenomenal if it is consistent and implicitly
knowing one is F is being F . Explicit knowledge is something like attending to the fact that something is
the case, implicit knowledge is simply knowledge, which may be present without one attending to the fact
to what one knows.
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(4) If the luminous conception is true and pain is phenomenal, then necessarily if one is
in pain one knows that one is in pain.
(5) Pain is phenomenal.
(6) The luminous conception is not true. (3-5)
There are more inflationary readings of concept talk. But if the deflationary argument
proves to be unsound so will any version of the argument that uses some more inflated
reading of concept talk.
The argument is valid. Is it sound? I won’t challenge premises (4) or (5). This only leaves
premises (1) and (2). Premise (2) can be motivated by a pretty straightforward argument:
(i) necessarily whatever one knows one believes; (ii) necessarily whatever one believes one
is able to believe. (ii) strikes me as completely obvious. What about (i)? Does knowledge
entail belief? Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (2013) have argued that there are cases in
which someone knows a proposition despite its being indeterminate whether they believe it.24
In fact they think something stronger: there is some particular case and they think that in
that case they know a proposition they don’t determinately believe. If that is correct, then
plausibly there are cases in which it is determinate that someone knows a proposition but
indeterminate whether one believes it.25 Any such case would be a counterexample to the
principle that knowledge determinately entails belief. If knowledge fails to determinately
entail belief then one is not in a position to know whether the above argument for (2) is
sound since one is not in a position to know one of the premises.
Even if (i) is true, some philosophers do not think it should be given default status. Some
recent studies by Murray et. al (2013) show that in a variety of cases, a significant minority of
English speaking non-philosophers are willing to ascribe knowledge without belief. Premise
(i) is not unassailable. While I am somewhat sympathetic to a conception of knowledge on
which it fails to entail belief, given that the majority of philosophers accept (ii) I do not
24For a response see Rose and Schaffer 2013.
25The reason is that they are prepared to assert that in that particular case, the proposition is known. But
plausibly one should not assert that which is indeterminate.
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want LC to stand or fall with its denial. In what follows I am going to sketch a response
that denies (1).
What can be said in favor of (1)? A standard motivation for premise (1) is to argue that
there are actually cases of nonhuman animals who feel pain but do not believe that they feel
pain. According to these objectors, the physical conditions required for pain are simpler, in
some sense, than those required for belief. The behavior indicative of pain is found in very
unsophisticated creatures. In these creatures, so the objection goes, there is no evidence of
belief like behavior.
But there is something unstable about this argument. The very evidence that the relevant
creature is in pain, it seems to me, is evidence that they believe that they are in pain (and thus
able to believe that they are in pain). Here is a simple argument for this conclusion. First,
we ought to favor a simple and uniform theory of human behavior according to which all
behavior is explained by belief desire psychology. So in particular, pain behavior in human
persons ought to be explicable in terms of their beliefs and desires. And second, similar
behaviors in different species suggest similar explanations. So in particular, the evidence
that nonhuman animals are in pain, namely that they exhibit similar pain behavior to us,
suggests a similar explanation to ours in terms of beliefs and desires. So when one finds
a creature that exhibits pain behavior, presumably that behavior is recognizable as pain
behavior because it is similar to our pain behavior. But our pain behavior is often explained
by our belief that we are in pain. Thus the natural conclusion is that nonhuman animals
pain behavior is similarly explained.
The point can perhaps be put more simply. The objector claims that there are creatures
who behave as if they are in pain, but lack beliefs. So either there is an asymmetry between
the explanation of their pain behavior and ours, or else there is no uniform theory of human
behavior in terms of beliefs and desires. Each of those options, it seems to me, is a theoretical
cost.
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I suspect that these considerations will fail to convince someone who is already committed
to (1). Many philosophers think in order know a proposition, one must grasp that propo-
sition. In turn, in order to grasp a proposition, they think, one must have some capacity
for the use of language. If we combine this view with LC, the result is that either, im-
plausibly, the capacity for language is much wider than we think, or, also implausibly, the
range of conscious creatures much narrower than we think. It’s worth pointing out that this
consequence is one that is shared by many theories of consciousness currently on offer. For
example, intentionalists think that experience constitutively involves a belief-like proposi-
tional attitude. Some philosophers even think this attitude is a determinable of knowledge.
Thus LC isn’t alone in offering a theory of experience that requires one to reject any tight
connection between propositional attitudes and the capacity for language.
If propositional attitudes are not bound up with our capacity for language in any inter-
esting sense, what are they bound up with? What is it about us and other creatures that
allows us to have propositional attitudes at all? This is no doubt a difficult question and
one I cannot fully answer here. However it is worth briefly sketching a picture of the propo-
sitional attitudes that sits more comfortably with LC, at least to illustrate that the thesis
is capable of being integrated with independently motivated pictures of the mind.
In order for LC to get off the ground, we need a theoretical account of knowledge that ex-
plains such knowledge independently of language. One view that I have quite a bit sympathy
for is a Williamsonian conception of knowledge according to which one knows that p if and
only if one bears some factive mental attitude to the proposition that p. On this conception
of knowledge, if knowing requires the capacity for language, then having factive attitudes in
general would require the capacity for language. But this doesn’t seem too plausible. After
all, perception itself seems to involve a factive attitude. But it should be common ground
that perceiving does not require the capacity for language.
Factive attitudes play an important role in the explanation of successful action. When
I see that the car is coming towards me, I have the ability to base my actions on the fact
that the car is coming towards me. On one view of propositional attitudes, they are posits
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in a theory of action. Factive attitudes play a distinctive role in this theory, accounting for
our ability to base our actions off of certain facts, rather than simply accidentally acting
in accordance with those facts. Whenever one bears some factive atttitude towards the
proposition that p, one has the ability to base their actions on the fact that p. Moreover,
normally, when one has the ability to base their actions on the fact that p, it is because one
bears some factive attitude towards the proposition that p. Thus generally, since knowledge
is the most general factive attitude, one knows that p if and only if one is able to base
their actions off of the fact that p.26 This sits well with LC since it seems quite plausible
that any being that has phenomenal properties is able to base their actions on the fact that
they phenomenal properties. Indeed this seems to be in some sense the point of phenomenal
properties. Even for someone hostile to LC, it would be quite surprising to find out that
there were a species of creatures who felt pain, but had no ability to adjust their actions as
a result of feeling pain. If they couldn’t adjust their actions accordingly, there would have
been no evolutionary advantage to feeling pain in the first place.
To sum up, I want to emphasize the following point. The basic idea of my response is
to first re-conceptualize the debate as being a debate about who has a better model of the
actions of organisms. I suggest we adopt a uniform model in which knowledge and belief play
a role in explaining the behavior of all organisms in much the same way that they explain our
own. This model combines rather well this the picture that (i) knowledge is a mental state
of some kind, and (ii) mental states are posits in the best overall theory of behavior of some
class of entities. When thought of this way, the idea that having a phenomenal property and
knowing that one has a phenomenal property go hand in hand starts to look to me pretty
plausible since it is only a few steps away from the observation that organisms invariably
have the capacity to act on the basis of their phenomenal properties. Thus LC seems to
fall out of a quite natural and uniform theory of the phenomenal properties of organisms in
general. This seems to me to lessen the force of the objection from conceptual sophistication
quite a bit. In effect what we have are two different theories of mental states in general. The
26See Stalnaker 1999, and Greco 2014 for further elaboration on this more deflationary notion of knowledge.
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theorist who takes propositional attitude to be bound up with language must explain why
that theory is better than its alternative. On my view, this is a theoretical task, and not one
that can be settled easily against the view I have been sketching.
4.3. Difference of awareness and awareness of difference. The following train of
thought has some initial plausibility:
Suppose that I present an arrangement of dots on a board in front of you.
You briefly experience this arrangement before I switch the board with a new
arrangement of dots. The new arrangement of dots is exactly similar to the
old arrangement of dots apart from the inclusion of one extra dot. However,
you fail to notice this dot. You would report that the two experiences were
qualitatively indistinguishable. This certainly seems like a possible case. But
given that it is possible, it would appear that there could be differences in one’s
perceptual experiences without any differences in one’s knowledge of which
perceptual experiences one is having. Since the luminous conception predicts
that there cannot be differences in one’s perceptual experiences–construed as
phenomenal properties–without a difference in knowledge of which perceptual
experiences one is having, the luminous conception is false.
This objection has been raised by Dretske in several influential papers arguing against the
higher order view of consciousness. His conclusion, in his own words, is that
...there can be conscious differences in a person’s experience of the world–and,
in this sense, conscious features of his experience–of which that person is not
conscious. If this is true, then it cannot be a person’s awareness of a mental
state that makes that state conscious. (Dretske , 2000, p. 132)
The argument is fallacious, at least applied to LC. Call the two arrangements presented
‘arrangement 1’ and ‘arrangement 2’. Call the phenomenal property one has upon observing
arrangement 1 ‘experiencing arrangement 1’ and the phenomenal property one has while
observing arrangement 2 ‘experiencing arrangement 2’. I will follow Dretske in supposing
that experiencing arrangement 1 is not experiencing arrangement 2. The inclusion of another
dot in arrangement 2 makes for a real conscious difference upon experiencing it. In the case
described, there is a certain time t0, such that
(1) at t0, one experiences arrangement 1.
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And there is a time t1 after t0 with the property that
(2) at t1, one experiences arrangement 2.
At neither t0 nor t1 is one experiencing both arrangement 1 and 2. LC together with (1)
and (2) entails both (3) and (4).
(3) at t0, one knows that one is experiencing arrangement 1.
(4) It is not the case that at t1, one knows that one is experiencing arrangement 1.
That is, LC predicts that a change in phenomenal properties corresponds to a change in
knowledge of phenomenal properties. However, (4) does not entail (5)
(5) at t1, one knows that it is not the case that one is experiencing arrangement 1.
Now (2), together with the luminous conception entails
(6) at t1, one knows that one is experiencing arrangement 2
But even with (6), (3) and (4) do not deliver (5). LC does not predict that whenever
there is a change in one’s phenomenal properties, one knows that there is a change in one’s
phenomenal properties.
How does Dretske think we get to (5) from the description of the case and LC? One
hypothesis is that Dretske subtly conflated positive introspection and negative introspection.
Positive introspection says that whenever a certain condition obtains, it is known to obtain.
Negative introspection says that whenever a certain condition fails to obtain, one knows that
it fails to obtain. LC entails positive introspection. It does not entail negative introspection.
Dretske sometimes puts the point as follows: there can be differences in our conscious
awareness without awareness of the difference. So put, the point is ambiguous. On one
reading it is true but consistent with the luminous conception. On another reading, it is
false, but that reading is so hard access that it is no wonder that the sentence sounds true.
A simple model of the above situation will help bring out the ambiguity. Suppose that
experiencing arrangement 1 is identical to the conjunction of f1, . . . , fn and experiencing
arrangement 2 is identical to the conjunction of f1, . . . , fn−1, gn. Intuitively gn is that phe-
nomenal property which corresponds to the extra dot that one experiences and fn is that
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phenomenal property associated to the blank space. When one experiences arrangement 2,
“the difference in one’s conscious awareness” might just be identified with gn. Is one aware
of that difference? Well if the the luminous conception is correct, then one knows that one
has gn. So there is a difference, namely gn, such that one is aware, in some sense, of it. But
that is consistent with one not knowing that there is a difference i.e., not knowing that there
is some phenomenal property they currently have but didn’t have several moments ago. All
Dretske’s case shows is that there can be a difference and one not know that there is a differ-
ence. It doesn’t show that there can be difference, a particular phenomenal property, despite
one not knowing that one has it. There being a property that is the difference such that one
knows that one has it, and one knowing that there is some property that is a difference are
different cognitive accomplishments.
4.4. Anti-luminosity. A celebrated argument due to Timothy Williamson attempts to
show on the basis of general structural constraints on knowledge that there are no non-
trivial luminous conditions. The argument can be adapted to the present case. In this
context, it is given as an argument for the conclusion that there are no consistent luminous
properties. If sound, LC would then have the consequence that there are no phenomenal
properties.
The most straightforward adaptation makes use of the principle that knowledge requires
belief that is safe from error: if one knows that p, then in nearby circumstances one does
not falsely believe that p.27
More precisely:
Safety: For any possible situation s, if in s one knows that p, then for any possible situation
s′ nearby s, in s′ if one believes that p then p.
Say that a sequence of (possible) situations s1, . . . , sn is problematic for a property X if
and only if
27In what follows I work with a rather simplified version of the argument that more closely resembles a
version presented by Srinivasan (2015). Ultimately I would need to respond to the more sophisticated
versions given in terms of confidence, but to do so would require more space than can be provided here.
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(1) In s1, one is X.
(2) In sn, one is not X.
(3) si+1 is nearby si for 1 ≤ i < n.
(4) If in si, one knows that one is X, then in si+1, one believes that one is X.
Suppose that there is a sequence s1, . . . , sn of situations that is problematic for a phenom-
enal property X. Then it follows, given the truth of Safety, that LC is false. Here is why.
In s1 one is X and in sn one is not X by supposition. Therefore, there is some 1 ≤ i ≤ n such
that in si, one is X and in si+1, one is not X. Since si+1 is nearby si, Safety guarantees
that either one does not believe on is X in si+1, or one does not know one is in X in si.
So by supposition in si, one does not know that one is X. Thus there is some phenomenal
property X, such that possibly one is X and does not know that one is X. Therefore, LC
is false.
At this point, the argument is merely schematic in character. We need to be given some
reason to think that there are problematic sequences for phenomenal properties. Williamson
(2000) described the following possible example:
Consider a morning on which one feels freezing cold at dawn, very slowly
warms up, and feels hot by noon. One changes from feeling cold to feeling
not cold, and from being in a position to know that one feels cold to not being
in a position to know that one feels cold.(2000, p. 97)
More formally, let t1, . . . , tn be a sequence of times at one millisecond intervals from dawn
to noon. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let αi be a centered possible world whose time coordinate is ti and
whose center is the agent described in Williamson’s case. Then α1, . . . , αn is a candidate for
being a problematic sequence for the property of feeling cold.28 The basic idea, following
Srinivasan (2015), is that the pairs of cases αi and αi+1 are one’s in which the subjects
phenomenal properties are idiscriminable, and so that if one knows that one has the a given
28We can suppose for the sake of argument that feeling cold is phenomenal, though I suspect that it is better
thought of as derivative from one’s phenomenal properties rather than a phenomenal property in the strict
sense.
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phenomenal properties in αi, and so thereby believes one has that property, then one should
also believe in the next moment due to the fact that how things stand with them vis-a-vis
coldness in αi+1 indiscriminable from how things stood in αi.
29.
In response to this argument I want to say three things. First, as has already been
noted by Berker (2008), Weatherson (2004) and Srinivasan (2015), the judgment that
condition (4) is satisfied in the above case is going to look quite a bit less plausible to
the theorist who takes there to be some sort of constitutive connection between belief and
phenomenal properties. The justification for (4) is something like this: if I know that I have
some phenomenal property X in αi, then since αi+1 is indiscriminable from αi we would
expect the belief to remain since our beliefs are governed by dispositions to respond to
similar circumstances in similar ways. Moreover, since we are beings with limited powers of
discrimination, my dispositions to believe cannot be so finely individuated so as to be activate
belief in one situation without thereby activating belief in any indiscriminable situation (at
least generally).Now this argument is of course just a sketch, though versions of it have been
developed at more length by, for instance, Srinivasan (2015). The important point is that if
one is already sympathetic to LC, one is not going to accept this view that one’s knowledge
of X requires some “basis,” nor would one accept that one’s powers of discrimination are
“limited” with respect to phenomenal properties. If, for any phenomenal property X, being
X is knowing that one is X, there is no limitation with respect to our ability to discriminate
phenomenal properties. Additionally, if being X is knowing that one is X, one’s belief is
automatically induced by simply having the phenomenal property. The explanation of one’s
belief in αi is not that one is disposed to respond to one’s phenomenal properties in certain
ways in certain circumstances. The explanation is simply that one has the phenomenal
property, which, given LC, raises the probability that one believes one has the property to
1.
29Note that even if α1, . . . , αn lacked property (4) it would suffice to swap out any αi+1 with a βi+1 that was
phenomenal indiscriminable from αi+1 but is such that, if one knows inαi, one believes in βi+1 (provided of
course there is such a βi+1. Note though that it is a substantive claim that βi+1 must thereby be nearby.
For further discussion see the principle (BEL∗) in Srinivasan (2015)
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This response merely points out that in order to convince someone who already accepts
LC, more needs to be said to motivate the claim that condition (4) is met in the above sce-
nario. However there are also two positive reasons for resisting Williamson’s anti-luminosity
argument that the proponent of LC can appeal to.
Williamson (2000) is known for advocating the view that knowledge is the most general
factive mental state. That is, for any proposition p and factive mental state V , if one V s that
p, then one knows that p. So if the above situation describes a sequence that is problematic
for the property of being cold, and knowledge is the most general factive mental state, it
follows that there is a possible situation in which one is cold, but does not V that one is cold,
for any factive mental state V . But as was also noted by Williamson (2000, ), ‘one could feel
that’ expresses a factive attitude. Thus the anti-luminosity argument implies, given other
theses Williamson accepts, that it is possible that one is cold but could not feel that they
were cold. This strikes me as being inconsistent with Kripke’s content that being cold just
is feeling cold. Perhaps one could say that they felt cold but could not feel that they were
cold. But I have a hard time parsing that sentence in a way that sounds consistent.
The point is not just restricted to feelings. Consider a situation in which one experiences
a red chip that slowly turns from red to blue. At the beginning of the day, it is red. At the
end it is blue. Suppose moreover that one’s experiences is perfectly calibrated to track the
color of the chip. It represents the chips as red if and only if the chip is red throughout the
day. Since it is blue at the end of the day, there is some last moment tn at which it is red.
Thus at t one’s experience represents the chip as red but at tn+1 the chip is not red. Could
one see that the chip was red at tn? I’m inclined toward the view that they could. Since
one is perfectly tracking the color of the chip, it is red, and one’s experience represents that
it is red, one sees that it is red. But if one could see that it is red, then one knows that
it is red (since knowledge is the most general factive attitude). Thus one knows that it is
red despite the fact that in the next moment it is not red. But it seems to me that one’s
epistemic situation with respect to the proposition that one is cold in Williamson’s case is
analogous to one’s epistemic position with respect to the proposition that the chip is red in
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this case. Thus it seems to me that either we should reject Safety, or else say that in these
cases one’s belief in the given proposition correlates perfectly with one’s knowledge of the
given proposition.30
Now in some ways this could be read as more of an ad hominem against Williamson.
But it is not merely an ad hominem. I myself find the characterization of knowledge as
the most general factive mental state as somewhat compelling. If there is a most general
factive mental state, we might expect our word ‘knows’ to pick it out for reasons relating to
reference magnetism. Even if it doesn’t, provided that the most general factive mental state
plays some of the functional roles often attribute to knowledge, we could still formulate a
principle like LC in terms of this most general factive attitude that would share with LC
many of its benefits. That would then represent a natural fallback position for the proponent
of LC.
This response doesn’t say which premise of Williamson’s argument to reject. Instead it
points out that the conclusion conflicts with some other plausible theses, and so if we believe
these other plausible theses, we should reject at least one of the premises of Williamson’s
argument. The weakest premises in my view are Safety together with the idea the idea
that the sequences in questions jointly satisfy (3) and (4). For instance, in the above case in
which the chip turns from red to blue, it seems to me that seeing that it is red is compatible
with its being blue in the next instance. But if we appeal to the idea that our beliefs are
governed by imprecise dispositions, then for similar reason as before we should be able to
construct the case so that the belief lingers on in the next moment, thus either showing
that Safety is false, or else demonstrating that the next moment is no longer nearby the
previous one in the relevant epistemic sense.
30Note that if one points out that it is at least possible that in a scenario like this, there is belief at the next
moment, then that is certainly true. But in order for the two cases to be near, it has to be that the belief at
the next moment is “similarly based.” For instance a person who irrationally always believed the chip was
red would continue to belief the chip was red even as it turned blue. But this doesn’t immediately entail
that they cannot see that the chip is red, and so does not entail that they cannot know that the chip is red
(provided that knowledge is the most general factive attitude).
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The third and final response I want to give points out another way in which anti-luminosity
type arguments rely on premises that jointly predict some implausible consequences. Con-
sider the sorts of phenomenal properties of most interest in the philosophy of perception:
those phenomenal properties that correspond to the fine grained representation of color. For
instance, in the above phenomenal continua case one has a sequences of phenomenal proper-
ties: red121, red120 and so on. Can one know that one has them at all? I suspect the intuitive
answer is: yes of course! Even those who think we sometimes have a phenomenal property
while failing to know that we do will accept that we often know that we have the specific
phenomenal properties that we in fact have. But if the anti-luminosity argument is correct,
there is what appears to be an equally compelling case that we can never know that we
have these specific phenomenal properties. For suppose we can construct a sequence of cases
α1, . . . , αn that is problematic for the phenomenal property red (by which I mean something
like the experience of red). Then there is some case αi such that in αi one has red and in
the next moment one does not. Now if one knows that one has red, then by (4) it should
follow that in αi+1 one believes one has red. The justification for this appeal is again the
supposed imprecise nature of the dispositions governing our beliefs. But note that in αi, one
also has some highly specific phenomenal property red′ that is a determinate of red. Since
red′ is highly specific, we can suppose that in the next moment, one lacks it and instead
has some other indiscriminable phenomenal property red′′. Now I don’t see why we should
suppose that knowledge of red requires belief in the next moment without also requiring
that knowledge of red′ requires belief in the next moment as well. The same motivation can
be applied to get this conclusion. Since our highly specific phenomenal properties are con-
stantly changing, one is red′ only for a moment before one acquires a different, but perhaps
barely discriminable, phenomenal property. So if knowledge of the determinate phenomenal
property requires belief in the next instance, then given Safety, one would never know one
had red′ in any ordinary situation.
One could just embrace this conclusion. It suffices that we often have knowledge of our
determinable phenomenal properties. Knowledge of their determinates is just too hard a
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feat for normal adult humans. I sort of have a hard time believing that, though. When I
look around the room, there seems to be some highly specific phenomenal features I have,
and it seems to me that I know that I have them. I might express this knowledge by saying
to myself, at each moment, “Things are like this” or “This is how things are,” using the
demonstrative to refer to the highly specific phenomenal properties I had in that instant.
Thus if we do have such knowledge generally, that suggests something is amiss with the anti-
luminosity argument, since parallel arguments can be constructed that lead to the conclusion
that we lack knowledge in situations in which we do not.31,32
5. Conclusion
In this paper I’ve set out (part of) the case for the thesis that to be phenomenal is to
be consistent and luminous. There is much more to be said for and against this thesis.
Some possible future avenues for investigation would be a fuller accounting of the costs and
benefits as compared to other first order theories of the phenomenal. There are also further
applications of the thesis to the philosophy of action, the philosophy of understanding and
the philosophy of emotions that are worth investigating. 33There are no doubt many other
objections that I could have addressed. For instance, the thesis likely has some bearing on
31Amia Srinivasan (2015) grants that someone who accepts a tight connection between the phenomenal and
the doxastic avoids Williamson’s argument as it is formulated above. However there is a more sophisticated
version of the argument that is closer to Williamson’s original formulation that she takes to avoid the pitfalls
of the simpler version. Unfortunately responding to Srinivasan’s formulation of the argument will have to
wait.
32I want to briefly respond to one further objection here that has been raised by an anonymous reviewer.
Consider the property of being such that, if one has that property, one knows that one has it. Call that
property ‘P ’. Thus if P exists, then
P = being such that if one has P , one knows that one has P .
Clearly if such a property exists, it is luminous. For suppose that one has P . Then one is such that if one
has P , one knows that one has P . And so one knows that one has P . But I don’t think there is any such
property. Here is why: there is at least one thing that doesn’t know anything. The table that my computer
is sitting on, for example, does not know anything. Call this table ‘t’. Now if t does not have P , then t
is not such that if t has P , t knows that t has P . Since the negation of a conditional is equivalent to the
conjunction of its antecedent with the negation of its consequent, it follows that t has P and t does not know
that t has P . In particular, t has P . So if t does not have P , t has P . This (classically) implies that t has
P . So t is such that if t has P , t knows that t has P . So t knows that t has P . So t knows something. But
surely it doesn’t!
33Basically since phenomenal properties play a very distinctive role on this theory, there is potential appli-
cation of the theory in any area where knowledge itself plays a distinctive role.
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the question as to whether experiential content is “conceptual” or ‘nonconceptual,” though
spelling out what the connection is precisely is not as straightforward as it might seem.
Here, I only hope to have shown that the thesis is interesting and worth taking seriously as
a theory of the phenomenal.
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